In 2015 Gazprom increased gas exports to the region by 8% compared with 159.4bn m³ in 2014. The latest official statistics also indicate that Gazprom's gas exports experienced significant growth in the first four months of 2016.

BP’s energy outlook this year foresees a compound annual growth rate of gas demand at 1.8% until 2035. In the OECD, this growth results from the coal-to-gas transition in power generation. The US major ExxonMobil supports this view, forecasting gas will account for 30% of the power sector and will equal coal by 2040.

It is absolutely compatible with the Energy Union. It will be sustainable, affordable and help security of supply, he said. It will increase liquidity in Europe but nobody will be forced to buy the gas, which will be priced against hubs.

"We have such low production costs that we will always be able to cut the selling price by a dollar or two when it comes to fighting off a rival," said a senior source at Gazprom.

"We are glad that we've managed to maintain our positions on traditional markets, primarily in Europe," Sechin said pointing out to recent agreements with PKN Orlen to increase deliveries to Poland and the Czech Republic.

Shipping 110bn m³/yr would cost Gazprom a quarter of the amount it would spend if it used Nord Stream, while booking capacity for 70bn m³/yr would still cost it only a third as much.

Gazprom's accumulated after-tax dividends will total USD 6.9 billion by 2045. Over the next 25 years, gas deliveries via Nord Stream 2 would be 2–2.7 times more economically efficient than the ones via Ukraine's GTS, which translates into USD 45–78 billion.

What determines dependence on Russian gas is what buyers buy, and the market decides that. Gas follows the price.

For us it is a principal issue. Gazprom has launched a programme to optimise expenses in the central corridor which now has free capacities which also cost us money. We will hence liquidate 4,300 km of pipes and close 62 compressor stations.

In 2015 global demand for primary energy grew by only 1%, significantly slower than the 10-year average. This reflected continued weakness in the global economy and lower growth in Chinese energy consumption as the country shifts from an industrial to a service-driven economy.